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ADMIRALTY.
Limitation of Liability-Proceedings by Owner before Suit against
him.-Notwithstanding Admiralty Rules, 54-57, the owner of a vessel
may institute appropriate proceedings in a court of competent jurisdiction to obtain the benefit of the limitation of liability provided for by
sections 4284 and 4285, Rev. Stat., without waiting for a suit to be
begun against him or his vessel fbr the loss out of which his liability
arises : .Eparte Slayton, S. 0. U. S., Oct. Term 1881.
AGENT.

See Bank.

Banks as Collecting Agents-Negligence of LCrresondents.-Where
the holder of a bill of exchange payable at a distant place deposits it
with a local bank for collection, he thereby assents to the course of
business of banks to collect through correspondents, and the correspondent of the local bank to which the bill is forwarded becomes his
agent, and is responsible to him directly for negligence in failing to
present the bill for payment within the proper time : Guelich v. The
National State Bank of Burlington, 56 Iowa.
Voluntary Association- Contract of Conmittee.-A member of a
voluntary association is not liable for a debt incurred by a committee
of the association, if it does not appear that the member was present at
the meeting appointing the committee, and there is no evidence of the
olger v. Ray, 131 Mass.
authority of the committee to incur the debt:
ASSIGNMENT.

See Debtor and 0-editor; .Partnership.
ATTORNEY.

Contingent Fee-Not Recoverable.-An agreement between an attorney and client, by which the attorney is to prosecute an action for a
sum of money in which he has himself no previous interest, and to
receive, in case of success, one-half of the sum recovered after deducting
the costs of the action, and nothing in case of failure, is unlawful and
void for champerty and maintenance; and the client may maintain an
action for money had and received against the attorney for the whole
amount so recovered, less the costs paid by him: Achert v. Barker,
131 Mass.
I Prepared expressly for the American Law Register, from the original opinions
filed during Oct. Term 1881. The cases will probably appear in 14 or 15 Otto.
2 From Hon. John S. Runnells, Reporter; to appear in 56 Iowa Reports.
s From Hon. Frank MeGloin, Reporter; to appear in vol. 1 of his Reports.
4 'From John Lathrop, Esq., Reporter ; to appear in 131 Massachusetts Reports.
5 From Arnold Green, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 13 Rhode Island Reports.
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BANK.

See Agent; Corporation.

Employment of Notary to protest Paper-Neglectof Notar.-A bank
receiving commercial paper for collection, and placing it in the hands of
a notary authorized by law to protest such paper, is not. liable for the
failure of the notary to perform his duty : Britton v. Nicolls, S. C. U.
S., Oct. Term 1881.
Allen v. illerchants' Bank. 22 Wend. 215, disapproved; Dorchester
and .llilton Bank v. New _England Bank, 1 Cush. 177, followed : I .
BIL

OF LADING.

Issuing of,for Goods not received- Authority of Master or Shipping
Agent-Invalidity in hands of bonafide Purchaser.-Neitherthe master
of a vessel nor the shipping agents of steamboats on the rivers of the
interior, at points where they receive and deliver cargo, have authority to bind the vessel or its owners by giving a bill of lading for
,goods or cargo not received for shipment: Pollardv. Vinton, S. (. U.
S., Oct. Term 1881.
Such a bill of lading being outside of the power conferred by the
agent's authority, is void in the hands of a person who may have afterwards in good faith taken it and advanced money on it: Id.
BILLS AND NOTES.

See Payment.

Acceptance of Check-Surrender of Draft to Drawee-Dischargeof
Drawer.-If the payee of a draft presents and surrenders it to the
drawee, and receives during business hours the latter's check fbr the
amount thereof, which is not presented to the bank on which it is
drawn until the next day, and payment is then refused, the drawer of
the draft is discharged from liability thereon : Fernald v. Bush, 131
Mass.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

See Limitations, Statute of

Retroactive Legislation- When valid.-Courts will not readily give a
retroactive effect to legislation ; but rather hold it applicable alqne to
the future : Dours v. Cazentre, 1 MeGloin.
Where, hoever, legislation is not ec post facto and does not divest
vested rights, impair the obligation of a contract, or otherwise violate
the Constitution, it may be made retroactive : Id.
PenalStatute-Due Processof Law.-A statute provided that "1every
person who shall keep a place in which it is reported that intoxicating
liquors are kept for sale without having a license therefor, * * * shall
be fined not more than $20 or imprisoned not more than thirty days, or
both :" Held, That the statute was unconstitutional and void; both
as violating the fundamental constitutional rights of property and
personal freedom ; and as depriving a defendant accused under it of
property and liberty without due process of law : State v. Kartz, 13
R. L
Taxation-Telegraph Messages.-The imposition by a state upon
every chartered telegraph company doing business within its borders,
of a tax of one cent on every full rate message sent, is unconstitutional
as to messages sent out of the state, and as to messages of the federal
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government. As to the former it is-a regulation of inter-state commerce,
and as to the latter it is a tax on the means employed by the government to execute its constitutional
1881. Union Telegraph
Oeb. TermWcstern
S., powers:
Co. v. State of Texas, S. 0. U.
CONTEMPT.
Justice of the Peace-Jurisdiction-NonPayment of Fine-Imprisonment.-A justice of the peace has no authority to commit a person to prison for non.payment of a fine for contempt, where the judgment
imposing the fine does not provide for imprisonment; and he is liable
for damages, in an action of tort, to a person so illegally committed:
Lanpher v. Dewell, 56 Iowa.
CONTRACT.

Made by Officer of Corporation-PersonalLiability on.-A contract
containing the words "we promise to pay," and signed by two persons
describing themselves respectively as "president school board" and
"secretary school board," but which contained no reference to any
school district, was held to be the personal obligation of the signers,
who could not show by parol evidence that such was not in fact the
intention : Wing v. Glick, 56 Iowa.
CORPORATION.

Ultra Vires-Railroad-MusicalFestival.-It is beyond the powers
of a railroad corporation chartered by the legislature, or of a corporation organized under the statute of 1870, ch. 224, for the manufacture
and sale of musical instruments, to guarantee the payment of expenses
of a musical festival; and no action can be maintained against either
corporation upon such a guaranty, although it was made with the reasonable belief that the holding of the proposed festival would be of great
pecuniary benefit to the corporation by increasing its proper business,
an'd the festival has been held and expenses incurred in reliance upon
the guaranty : Davis v. Old Colony Railroad, 181 Mass.
Transfer of Slock-Lien for Debt of Transferror- Waiver of.-A
statutory provision that no stockholder indebted to a bank shall transfer
his stock until payment of his debt, may be waived by the bank or by
its cashier acting for it by virtue of an express or implied authority:
Cecil National Bank v. Watsontown Bank, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term
1881.
The fact that the cashier was a member of the firm which owned te
stock and which was indebted to the bank, will not relieve the bank
from the effect of such a waiver, there being no collusion on the part
of the transferree and the cashier's membership in the firm being known
to the directors of the bank : Id.
A complete transfer of the title to the stock may be made by means
of appropriate entries on the stock ledger of the bank without the issuing of a certificate to the transferree, and where the bank made such a
transfer and allowed the transferree who had accepted the stock as collateral security, to rest in the belief that he had the title, it could not
afterwards, upon the insolvency of the transferror, enforce a statutory
lien on the stock for the latter's debt: Id.
VOL. XXX.-69
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ORIMINAL LAW.

Misdemeanor by Married Woman-Proximity of .usband-C oerion.--The mere proximity of a husband not actually present when his
wife commits a minor offence, will not raise in her favor the presumption that she acts under his coercion : State v. Shee, 13 R. I.
Any inference of coercion from such proximity is a question of fact:
Id.
DAMAGES.

Breach of Contract to convey Land.-The measure of damages for
the breach of a contract to convey land, where it occurs without the
fault of' the vendor, is the consideration paid him for the land, with
interest, but if the fiailure occurs through his fault, the vendee may recover such consideration, or the value of the land at the time the conveyance should have been mdde, if greater than the consideration paid:
Tokom v. McBride, 56 Iowa.
DEBTOR AND CREDITOR.

Assignment for C'reditors-Powersgiven to Assignee by the deed.A. made an assignment for the benefit of his creditors of his estate, part
of which was under mortgage, and in the deed of assignment empowered
the assignee to sell at public or private sale, to buy in the premises, to
resell without responsibility for loss, and also to mortgage, and from the
proceeds to pay, first, the creditors secured by mortgage, and then the
other creditors of the assignor; Held, that the deed of assignment was
valid as against creditors, for it did not appear that any benefit accrued
to the assignor, at their expense, from the powers given : Waldron v.
Wilcox, 13 R. I.
A plaintiff has no greater rights against the garnishee than the principal defendant debtor would have if himself suing; Id.
ESTOPPEL.

See Sheriff's Sale.

-EXECUTION.

.Exemption- Construction of Statute- alary.-The rule is that the
property of a debtor is the common pledge of all his creditors, and exemptions, being in the nature of exceptions to the general law, will be
strictly construed: Pitardv. Carey, 1 MdcGloin.
One who does work on a public building, under a contract, is not an
officer within a statutory exemption of the salary of an office : Id.
FRAUDS, STATUTE OF.

Contractfor Employment for a ear-When within Statute.-August
20th, an oral contract was made between A. & B., by which A. was to
enter B.'s service for one year, A. to begin the term of service as soon
as he could. A. began work for B. August 27th. Held, that the
contract was within the Statute of Frauds, being an oral contract not to
be performed within a year. Held, farther, that an action by A.
against 13. for a breach of this contract could not be maintained: Sutcliffe v. The Atlantic Mills, 13 R. I.
HUSBAND AND WIFE.

See CriminalLaw.
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INTEREST.
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See Limitations, Statute of.
INTERPLEADER.

Latent Ambiguity in Will- Uncertain-Descriptionof Legutee-Parol
Evidence-Costs.-If a legdtee is not described in a will with exact accuracy, and the description may, in some respects, be applicable to different persons, each of whom claims the legacy, the executor may maintain a bill of interpleader for the determination of the person to whom
the legacy is payable: 11oss v. Stearns, 131 Mass.
Extrinsic evidence of the conduct and the declarations of a testator
is admissible -to show his relation to, and state of feeling towards, any
of the respective claimants of a legacy, where the legatee is not described with entire accuracy, and the description is in some respects
applicable to each of the claimants : ld.
A woman who had two nephews, one named Joseph White Sprague,
and the other Joseph Sprague Stearns, by her will bequeathed a legacy
Held, that the inference was that she
"to my nephew J. S. Sprague."
intended Joseph White Sprague ; and that, in the absence of extrinsic
evidence sufficient to control this inference, he was entitled to the
legacy: Id.
If the ambiguity of a will renders it doubtful to which of two persons a legacy shall be paid, the costs as between solicitor and client, of
all parties to a bill of interpleader by the executor are to be paid out
of the general estate of the testator : Id.
JUDGMENT.
Revival-Effect on Original Judgment-Appeal.-A judgment of
revival does not validate or otherwise alter the nature or effect of the
original judgment: Weiller v. Blanks, 1 McGloin.

The fact that a plaintiff has appealed from a judgment in his favor,
not entirely satisfactory to him, does not prevent him from suing for its
revival: Id:
Such a proceeding for revival will not prejudice his rights on appeal.
It.
Judgments for money are prescribed by ten years from the date of
their rendition : .ld.
The prescription in such case runs from the date of the rendition by
the inferior court, and not from that of its confirmation by the appellate tribunal: Id.
The date of' such :"rendition" by the inferior court is that of the
signing of the judgment by the judge thereof: Id.
The pendency of an appeal, even suspensive, does not stay the course
of prescription against a judgment, no matter whether plaintiff or
defendant be appellant: Pd.
LANDLORD AND TENANT.

Lien for Rent-Receivership of Tenant's Propert.-The lien of a
landlord will not be defeated by the conversion of the property of a
tenant into money by a receiver under an order of court, but will
attach to the proceeds in the receiver's hands : Gilbert v. Greenbaum,
56 Iowa.
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LEMITATIONS, STATUTE OF.

Action for False Search by Public O.fficer.-The action against a
recorder of' mortgages. tbr furnishing a false certificate, arises ex contractu and not cx delicto, and hence the prescription of one year does
not apply : Brown v. Penn, 1 MeGloin.
CoiTos- Time when Limitation commences to Run.-The cause of
action upon a coupon of a municipal bond, whether detached from the
bond or not., accrues, and the statute commences to run at the maturity
or the coupon : Town, of Koshkonong v. Burton, S. 0. U. S., Oct. Term
1881.
It is within the constitutional power of the legislature to require as
to existing causes of action that suits for their enforcement shall be
barred unless brought within a less period than that prescribed when
the contract was made. The exertion of this power is, however, subject'
to the fundamental condition that a reasonable time, taking all the circumstances into consideration, be given by the new law before the bar
takes effect: Id.
If interest upon interest is allowed by the local law at the time of
the contract, that right cannot be impaired by a subsequent legislative
declaration as to what was, in the judgment of that department, the true
intent and meaning of the statutes prescribing and limiting the rate of.
interest in force when the contract was made : Id.
.iortgage-Revival of Debt-ntervening.Liens.-A note and mortgage which have become barred by the Statute of Limitations may be
revived by an admission of indebtedness by the mortgagors, and the
priority of the mortgage lien will thereby be preserved as against, subsequent liens, taken before the mortgage became barred, and not foreclosed until after it is revived: Day v. Baldwin, 34 Iowa 380, distinguished; Kerdt v. Porterfield, 56 Iowa.
LUNATIC.

Validity of Contriacts.-Persons of unsound mind will be bound by
their executed contracts where such contracts are fair and reasonable
and were entered into by the other parties without knowledge of the
mental unsoundness, in the ordinary course of business, and where the
parties cannot be placed in statu quo : Abbott v. Creal, 56 Iowa.
MORTGAGE.

See Limitations, Statute of; Sale.

iUNICIPAL

CORPORATION.

Performance of Public Duty-egligene-Liability.-A private
action does not lie at common law against a municipal corporation, either
for the non-performance or for the negligent performance of a public
duty imposed on the corporation, without its request, by general statute,
unless it receives or is entitled to receive some privilege or profit in
consideration of 'the duty : Wixon v. City qf Newport, 13 R. I.
Nor does such an action lie when the duty, not being imposed by
statute, is voluntarily assumed under and in pursuance of a general law
of the state: 1d.
The school laws of Rhode Island create a school system under which
the towns are encouraged but not absolutely required to maintain public
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schools. A. was injured by a defect in the heating apparatus in a
public school of the city of Newport, A being a pupil in the school
field, That the city was not liable for the injury suffered : Id.
Ordinance-Evidence-Nuisance- Use of Highwa.-The courts will
not take notice, ezpropria motu, of municipal legislation; ordinances,
&c., of municipal governments must be established by proof: Laviosa
v. Ohicago, St. L. and N. 0. Railroad Co., 1 McGloin.
Where, by law. certain restrictions are placed upon the construction
of awnings, sheds or other works, there is an implied authorization
to erect such structures, provided the prohibition of the, law be respected : Id.
Without general legislation, denouncing all of its special class or
character as nuisance, the municipal authorities of a city-cannot declare
any particular thing to be a nuisance and abate it as such : Id.
Municipal ordinances must be reasonable and not arbitrary or oppressive, otherwise they are void; and a railroad company may be prevented
from making an unreasonable or oppressive use of a street or banquet,
despite municipal legislation expressly authorizing such particular manner of use: Id.
NUISANCE.
ORDINANCE.

See Aunicipal Co2poration.
See

fMunicipal Corporation.

PAE.TNERSHIP.

Indefinite duration-Rigt to withdraw-Advances by Partner.-A
partner of a firm formed for an indefinite time may withdraw when he
pleases, and dissolve the partnership, if he acts without any fraudulent
purpose ; and he is not liableto his copartner for damages caused by
such withdrawal: Fletcher v. Reed, 131 Mass.
A partner, to whom the firm is indebted for advances made by him,
is entitled, in a settlement of its affairs, to charge the firm with the
amount paid-by him: Id.
Purchasefrom Copartner-Knowledgeof Insolvency/.-The purchase
by one partner of his copartner's interest, in the firm property, is not
rendered void for fraud because of the fact that the buyer has knowledge of his partner's insolvency, if he had no reason to suppose it is the
latter's intention to defraud his creditors by the sale : Id.
Interest in, when included in General Assignmet.-An assignment
of "all and all manner of goods, chattels, debts and effects and other
estate of what kind and nature soever, and wheresoever situate, of
which the assignor is the lawful owner excepting only what and so
much as is exempt from attachment," conveys the assignor's interest as
copartner in the property of his copartnership : Stiness v. Pierce, 13
R.I.
PATENT.

Bill for account of Profits merely- When Maintainable.-A bill in
equity for a naked account of profits and damages against an infringer of
a patent cannot be sustained. Such relief can only be afforded in equity
where it is incidental to some other equity, 'the right to enforce which
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secures to tne patentee his standing in court : Root v. Lake Shore &
ff. S. Railway Co., S. 0. U. S., Oct. Term 1881.
The equity to which such relief is usually incidental is the right to
an injunction against infringement; but other grounds of equitable relief
may arise, as where the title of the complainant is equitable, or equitable
interposition is necessary on account of the impediments which prevent
a resort to remedies purely legal, and such an equity may arise out of
and inhere in the nature of the account itself, springing from special
and peculiar circumstances which disable the patentee from a recovery
at law or render his legal remedy difficult, inadequate and incomplete,
and as such cases cannot be defined more exactly, each must rest upon
its own particular circumstances as furnishing a satisfactory ground of
exception from. the general rule : Id.
PAYMENT.

Acceptance of Note- When Payment- Question of Fact.-The giving and acceptance of a promissory note of a debtor for a pre-existing
debt secured by a mortgage is only presumptive evidence of payment;
and it is a question of fact for the jury, upon all the evidence in the
case, whether the note was given and received in payment of the mortgage debt; Dodge v. .Emerson 131 Mass.
At the trial of a writ of entry to foreclose a mortgage, the only question
was whether the debt secured by the mortgage had been paid by the
giving and acceptance of a new promissory note for the note secured by
the mortgage. The judge in the course of his charge remarked to the
jury that in the contingency of the maker of a promissory note becoming insolvent, an old note and mortgage might be more valuable than a
new note and mortgage. Held, that the tenant had no ground of exception. Id.
PRACTICE.

Ex parte Decree- izsworn
uStatements.-Any judicial determination
arrived at without notice and an opportunity to parties opposed in interest of being heard, is null and void: Wood v. Howard, I McGloin.
In the absence of general consent, courts cannot receive unsworn
statements, in lieu of formal proof; and a decree based upon such
unsworn statements, will be set aside : id.
RECEIVER.
See Landlord and Tenant.
SALE.

See Trover.

ConditionalSale in form of Lease-fortgagebyj Lessee-Attachment.
-A. conveyed to B. personalty under an agreement purporting to be a
lease, by the terms of which certain payments were to be made by B.
to A., at fixed times. In case B. failed to pay as provided, A. might
take possession of the personalty. On the expiration of the lease, B.
having complied with its terms, was to receive a bill of sale of the personalty ; pending the lease, B. mortgaged the personalty to 0. Subsequently the last payment was made by B. to A., and B. received a receipted bill of sale from A. A. immediately attached the personalty in
an action against B., whereupon C. replevied the personalty. Held, that
the so-called lease was a conditional sale. Held,.further, that B. acquired under this conditional sale, rights of which A. could not deprive
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him and which in the absence of any stipulation forbidding it, B. could
sell or mortgage. Held,.further, that on the last payment the title to
the personalty vested in B., whose mortgage became valid, and took precedence of A.'s attachment: Carpenter v. Scott, 13 R. I.
Williams v. Briggs, 11 R. I., 476, and Cook v. Corthell, ,1i.482,
explained and distinguished : Id.
SHERIFF'S SALE.

Rescission- When Creditor Estopped-Offer to Restore.-Where a
creditor participates in the distribution of the proceeds of property sold
under execution, he ratifies the same and is estopped from subsequently
attacking it: Adams v. Moulton, 1 McGloin.
Such a participation, however, if made in error of fact, might, upon
proper allegations, be rescinded : Id.
Such rescission could only be decreed in a suit for that purpose, to
which all who participated in the proceeds are made party : Id.
A person asking for the rescission of a contract, &c., must, as a prerequisite to his suit, return or tender what he has received from the
transaction complained of, and otherwise restore, so far as possible to
him, the condition of things as they stood before the contract, &c., that
he attacks: Id.
SHIPPING.

United States Commissioners' Fees-Reshlpment of Sailors.-The provision of sect. 4513, Revised Statutes, that the fee of $2 required to be
paid to the shipping commissioner for each seaman shipped, under sects.
4511 and 4512, shall not be exacted, where, on the return of the vessel,
the silor reships in the same vessel for another voyage, applies to reshipments for all voyages succeeding the first in regular order, and is not
limited to the reshipment for the one voyage immediately following the
one at which the fees were paid: Young v. American Steamship Co.,
S. 0. U. S., Oct. Term 1881.
STATUTE.

TAXATION.
TELEGRAPH.

See Exemption.

See Constitutional'Law
See Constitutional Law.
TRIAL.

Time of Introductionof Evidence.-A court may, in its discretion,
allow the introduction of evidence after the arguments of counsel have
been concluded: Darlandv. Rosencrans, 56 Iowa.
TROVER.

Conditional Sale-Right of Vendor.-If a chattel is sold and delivered upon condition that it shall be paid for on a certain day, and
shall remain the property of the seller until paid for, the seller has not
such .possession or right to immediate possession as will support an
action of tort in the nature of trover, against an officer who has attached
the chattel as the property of the purchaser, brought before the day
named for payment: Newhall v. Kingsbury, 131 Mass.
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Sale obtained by Fraud-Action by Vendor against VendeeDamages.-A. sold to B. certain personalty, on credit, upon the faith
of B.'s representations, which proved false and fraudulent. B. soon
after the sale mortgaged the personalty to a third party and also made
some payments to A. on account. Held, that A. could maintain trover
and conversion against B. without first notifying B. thl;; the 6ontract
of sale was.rescinded, without demanding the personalty irom B , and
without tendering to B. the amount received in part payment. Held,
further, that the amount received by A. as part of the consideration,
was, upon his bringing trover against B., retained as part of the indemnity due from B., and was to be deducted from the amount of damages
recoverable by A. from B..: Warner v. Vallily, 13 R. I.
In trover, the rule measuring damages is flexible. If the plaintiff
has a qualified interest in the chattel converted, he will recover a sum
sufficient to indemnify him, not the whole value of the chattel with
interest from the time of conversion : Id.
ULTRA VIRES.

See Corporation.

UNITED STATES.

Land Department- Conclusiveness of Rulings.-The courts cannot
exercise any direct appellate jurisdiction over the rulings of the officers
of the Land Department, nor can they reverse or correct them in a collateral proceeding between private parties founded upon them where no
fraud has been practised upon the officers and they themselves are not
chargeable with any fraudulent conduct: Quimby v. Coulan, S. C.
U. S., Oct. Term 1881.
VENDOR

AND VENDEE.

VFndor's Lien- Waiver of-Taking of other Securiy..-Where the
vendor of real estate took in part payment therefor the secured note of a
third person, endorsed by the vendee, it was held that he thereby
waived his right to a vendor's lien, though the security taken afterward proved worthless, it being considered good by all the parties at
the time it was taken : Kendrick v. .Eggleston, 56 Iowa.
VERDICT.

Compromise Verdict.-When a verdict has been arrived at by means
other than conviction of judgment on the part of the jury, this, if
proven, furnishes just cause for remanding: Dreyfus v. Lincoln, 1 NcGloin.
The mere fact that the jury has allowed plaintiff less than the evidence shows him entitled to, if his theory of the case be adopted, does
not establish the fact that the verdict was a compromise one : Id.
Circumstantial evidence can supply the place of direct proof only
when it points plainly to a particular conclusion,, and when it can
be reasonably explained only upon such particular theory : Id.
WILL.

See Interpleader.

